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Abstract
In two previous papers, I introduced SuperSpreader (SS) epidemic models,
offered some theoretical discussion of prevention issues, and fitted some mod-
els to data sets derived from published accounts of the ongoing MERS epi-
demic (concluding that a pandemic is likely). Continuing on this theme,
here I discuss prediction: whether, in a disease outbreak driven by super-
spreader events, a rigorous decision point—meaning a declaration that a
pandemic is imminent—can be defined. I show that all sources of prediction
bias contribute to generating false negatives (i.e., discounting the chance of
a pandemic when it is looming or has already started). Nevertheless, the
statistical difficulties can be overcome by improved data gathering and use
of known techniques that decrease bias. One peculiarity of the SS epidemic
is that the prediction can sometimes be made long before the actual pan-
demic onset, generating lead time to alert the medical community and the
public. Thus modeling is useful to overcome a false sense of security arising
from the long “kindling times” characteristic of SS epidemics and certain
political/psychological factors, as well as improve the public health response.
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Text
Again I avoid the standard journal format. The only prerequisites for reading
the main text of this paper are some familiarity with common statistical
terms or phrases such as “bias” and “maximum-likelihood estimation,” which
I assume most readers will recall from a college statistics course or will look
up on Wikipedia. I will relegate the statistical heavy-lifting to an appendix.
Perhaps the single most important contribution a mathematical modeler
can make for public health would be to invent a tool that could predict the
occurrence of a deadly world-wide pandemic of an infectious disease. As
is well-known, most such diseases derive from zoonotic transmission events
(meaning from an animal host in which the disease organism is endemic,
or is currently causing an epizootic, to humans); examples include plague,
influenza, Ebola, HIV, SARS, and MERS. When a pathogen jumps species
there is a likely requirement of certain genetic modifications before it can
cause efficient transmission in the new host population. The implication
is that prediction is primarily a business for geneticists—but, at present,
identifying the relevant mutations in the pathogen genome prior to their
appearance seems beyond geneticists’ capabilities. Perhaps that situation
will soon change; in the mean time, it is up to epidemiologists to use case data
and contact tracing to declare the moment when the pandemic is inevitable,
or has already begun. But is this even possible for the SuperSpreader (SS)
epidemic?
As I showed in previous papers, [1], [2], an SS epidemic is unlike an in-
fluenza or measles epidemic, for which classical, deterministic mathematical
models of the SIR (susceptible-infected-recovered) type are appropriate. The
SS epidemic has random outbursts and lulls, periodic re-introductions from
the zoonotic source, and a long “kindling” period before the pandemic be-
gins. (See Figure 1 for a typical simulated epidemic trajectory.) Moreover,
the case mortality for SARS and MERS is much higher than for influenza
or measles (16 percent for SARS and 40 percent for MERS, as I write, as
opposed to 2 percent for the 1918 flu), so by the time susceptibles drop lim-
iting the pandemic, the world would have suffered hundreds of thousands
to millions of deaths. Thus the key issue is not predicting the size of the
epidemic, but whether it is looming and we must quickly find a way to stop
it.
In paper II of the series, I used the information available to me (case-
incidence data) to fit some SS models to MERS data through April 2014 and
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Figure 1: Typical “run” of a simulated SS epidemic (parameters in text).
The timing of events is highly variable in different runs.
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asserted that a pandemic was likely. Since the data was less than optimal, I
used a “generic” technique from pattern recognition to find models that fit.
This work is more illustrative, so I will assume available detailed contact data
of just the type we would wish to have in order to estimate model parameters,
including R0, the average number of secondary (directly-infected) cases due
to one primary case (which could be sporadic, from zoonotic transmission,
or the secondary of yet another primary). In some instances this kind of
who-infected-whom data will be readily available through screening, e.g.,
for health care workers exposed to a patient (who have comprised a large
fraction of infections in the MERS epidemic), or passengers on a plane with
the primary case; but for others it will be difficult, e.g., for community-
derived infections. I’ll indicate the (mock) “data,” which will be generated
in simulations, by {n1, n2, n3, · · ·nN}, where ni stands for the number of
secondary cases caused by the i-th infected case.1 Of course, some contact
data would be missing, resulting in misclassification of secondary cases as
sporadic, causing undercounts of secondaries; I’ll discuss the impact of this
problem later.
For the model I choose a rather extreme two-level SS example2 that ap-
peared in the model fit of paper II; the parameters were: Rl (low-level infec-
tiousness) = 0.3, Rh (high-level) = 55, and R0 = 1.4. In addition, the non-
infectious and infectiousness periods were assumed lognormal with standard
deviation of twice the means. Both the span of reproductive numbers and
the large variance of the infectious period generate “extra-Poisson variation”
(terminology from [5]; V0 6= R0, where V0 is the variance of the secondaries)
and strongly affect the statistical issues, as we will see.
Since R0 is the parameter that will drive the prediction, how would we
estimate it from the secondaries data? Since we are presented with an i.i.d.
sample, the obvious (non-parametric) approach is simply:
Rˆ0 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ni. (1)
1With complete contact data the details of infection clusters could be worked out,
as assumed in [3] and [4], but as the distribution of secondaries for each primary is the
main issue, examining “cluster sizes” or “numbers of clusters” implies an inefficient use of
available information.
2For mathematicians: the technical description is a continuous-time, multi-type branch-
ing process with two types, non-exponential waiting times, and non-Poisson offspring dis-
tributions. See paper I.
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However this estimator is highly biased downward, as is seen in Figure 2.
All the estimates were less than one (meaning no pandemic).
What aspects of this problem might contribute to generating this peculiar
bias towards low R0 estimates? First, data points that one would normally
regard as outliers, and might even drop from the analysis, namely the su-
perspreader events, are in fact informative here. Second, there is skewing of
distributions from the lognormal infectious periods. Finally, there is “right
censored data,” which is a peculiarity of trying to estimate parameters dur-
ing an ongoing epidemic. The simulations used for Figure 2 were halted at
2000 total cases, on the logic that passing some threshold case load (hope-
fully smaller, but I will return to that issue below) is likely the moment
when we would prepare the statistical analysis. However, SS epidemics are
particularly prone to sudden explosions. Thus many people may have been
infected in the previous weeks—but then there would not have been time for
them to generate as many secondary cases as would be expected (and any
investigative or reporting lag would exacerbate this problem).
What can we do about these problems? As a second try, I adopted the
famous, asymptotically optimally-efficient, maximum likelihood method to fit
the model. This made some improvement, see Figure 3. Maximum likelihood
is well known to be biased in small samples, with bias of O(1/N), where N
here means the number of primary cases in the simulation (2000). One might
expect it to be small, but apparently something about the data still causes
trouble.3 When faced with the problem of estimating skewed distributions,
one is directed to try transforming the data. So I replaced ni by log(1+ni) and
fit the three-parameter model, again assuming sufficient data, by equating
model-averaged log(1+n) to empirical averages, see the Appendix for details.
This worked much better; see Figure 4.
However, clearly bias remained despite using these statistical tricks. What
about censorship? I simulated secondaries (for 2000 primaries) directly from
the probability rule4 with the same parameters as the model, but without
running the branching process and found Figure 5. Thus, the most important
factor biasing the data was not skewing or outliers, but right-censorship. This
3Similar underestimation bias should afflict the Bayesian method of estimating R0
described in [4], as it is based on a likelihood. For more on this issue, see subsequent
footnote.
4See formulas (3) of the Appendix; thus the computer chose the infectiousness type,
then a normal r.v., Z and a corresponding lognormal infectious period, then ran a Poisson
process to the end of that period, for 2000 cases, 1000 times.
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Figure 2: R0 estimated the easy way, from 1000 runs of the SS model with
2000 cases, showing downward bias.
Stopping the SS Epidemic III: Prediction 8
Histogram of R0 estimates (MLEs)
R0, estimated from secondaries data (with five NR steps)
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Figure 3: R0 estimated using maximum-likelihood model fits; same runs as
in Fig. 1
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Histogram of R0 estimates (Non−parametric, transformed)
R0, estimated from secondaries data (log transformed)
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Figure 4: R0 estimated from non-parametric log-transformed secondaries
data and model fitting; same runs as in Fig. 1
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Histogram of R0 estimates (averages, no censorship)
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Figure 5: R0 estimated from averages of secondaries, without running the
branching process (so no right censorship). 1000 runs, with 2000 primaries
per run.
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censorship may occur in practise because: the primary is still in the asymp-
tomatic (non-infectious) or infectious period, or some secondaries are still
asymptomatic and were not picked up through contact-tracing and screening
(by e.g., RT-PCR), when the prediction was made. However, we pay a major
cost for dropping cases, by lowering the power of the test.5 Although there
are well-known methods for improving estimation in the presence of censor-
ship (by imputation of missing entries), perhaps a preferable approach is to
get better data! Now let us assume that, in addition to secondaries data (the
{ni}), we have available the times of onset and termination of infectiousness
for the primary cases. This is not a great hardship; for SARS or MERS,
the infectious period may coincide with the symptomatic period, and the
endpoint of infectiousness with either the patient’s death or isolation. This
kind of data could be obtained from patient records and so should be easier
to derive than contact data.
So I assumed (and stored in simulations) infectiousness periods; the data
now consists of {ni, τi}, omitting cases where infectiousness onset was cen-
sored and if termination was, setting: τi = final time minus onset. (This
choice automatically drops primaries still in the non-infectious period, while
keeping secondaries infected before the cut-off time, even though they may
take a few more weeks to locate.) With this amplified data-set, maximum-
likelihood analysis is appropriate (see Appendix). Moreover, we do not have
to model the infectious period.6 See Figure 6.
Table 1 compares statistical properties of the four methods mentioned
above. The log-transformed with secondaries data and the MLE with both
secondaries and infectious-period data roughly tied on standard error, but the
latter had much smaller bias.
5For example, if I had dropped the last two weeks worth of cases from April 2014 in
the model-fit of paper II, I would not have been able to make the claim that R0 > 1 then.
6I adopted lognormal for the simulations and assumed it for fitting purposes, but no
data sets available to me influenced that choice. It just seemed reasonable.
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Histogram of R0 estimates (MLEs)
R0, estimated from secondaries and infectious−periods data
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Figure 6: R0 estimated (MLEs) from secondaries and infectiousness-periods
data (2000 cases).
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Table 1. Statistical Properties of Four Estimators of R0 for an SS epidemic.
1
Method Figure No. runs2 Bias Variance SE3
averages (S)4 2 1000 -.586 .0369 .617
ML (S) 3 852 -.464 .0126 .478
log-transformed (S) 4 848 -.264 .0306 .317
ML (S&P)5 6 848 .0398 .100 .319
1 Parameters as in text; 1000 runs stopped at 2000 cases.
2 Some runs had too few secondary “high-level” (n > 5) cases, or NR did
not converge.
3 Standard error; square root of: (Bias squared plus Variance).
4 Secondaries data only.
5 Secondaries plus infectiousness periods.
What about estimation in an epidemic with R0 < 1? See Figure 7. Al-
though there is some overestimation of R0, it is very minor. In fact, in only
220 of 1,000 runs were there enough high-level events (with more than five
secondaries) to even carry out parameter estimation; these runs are unlikely
to be judged pandemics, leaving only about 40 out of 1,000 (or 4 percent)
which would generate a false positive (crying “Pandemic!” when there wasn’t
one). Note that all forms of statistical bias tend towards generating false
negatives, i.e., a false sense of security that we will escape the horrors of a
world-wide epidemic.7
7The cluster-based methods of Blumberg and Lloyd-Smith, [4], are not applicable to
SS epidemics (as defined in my papers), despite the authors’ assertion that they have
incorporated “superspreader” events. As pointed out in an appendix to paper I, their
negative-binomial offspring distribution interpolates between a Poisson and a geometric;
but the latter is just a Poisson process run over an exponential infectivity time. Nei-
ther endpoint is biologically appropriate for an SS epidemic. Moreover, they tested their
methodology only for the case R0 < 1 (hence their “stuttering chains”), in which the
skewness, outlier, and censorship problems under discussion here do not arise. Using their
technique to argue that R0 < 1, as in [3], may be circular reasoning. Nevertheless, using
my models and kNN fitting technique, in August 2013 I did agree with the Lancet au-
thors that R0 for MERS was less than one at that time. But, looking at Fig. 8, I now
wonder whether we were all mistaken and that period was merely the “kindling” phase of
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Histogram of R0 estimates (Non−parametric, transformed)
R0, estimated from secondaries data (log transformed)
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Figure 7: R0 estimated from log-transformed secondaries data and model
fitting, but model R0 = 0.8. 1,000 runs, but all but 220 were dropped for
lack of superspreader events, see text.
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The MLE method with secondaries and infectious-periods data did a good
job at overcoming statistical bias. However, there is a fourth source of bias—
going in the same direction—shown in Figures 8 and 9. Figure 8 shows esti-
mations of R0 derived from secondaries data by the log-transformed method,
and Fig. 9 from secondaries plus infectious periods by the MLE method,
up to the number of cases shown on the x-axis, early in the epidemic. Note
how the estimates rise abruptly and then fall; what is happening is that the
estimates are driven upwards by an SS event and then fall as more non-SS
events accumulate. Note also how, ignoring the sawtooth pattern, the gen-
eral trend is upwards. (Fig. 9 looks better, but both figures have very few
dots because of too few “high-spreader events,” e.g., with n > 5, to run the
nonparametric estimators, early in the epidemic.) Call it “temporal bias,” by
which I mean bias due to estimating too early; it points in the same direction
as the statistical biases we saw in earlier diagrams, towards underestimating
R0.
8
In addition to techniques for decreasing bias, we need some way of assess-
ing confidence in our prediction. After some experimentation with popular
methodology (e.g., resampling and the “jackknife”) for constructing con-
fidence intervals9 which worked poorly at least in my implementation, I
recurred to the ancient Fisherian “reject the null hypothesis” philosophy.
Fisher’s method has the advantage that it addresses our major concern: that
the declaration of a pandemic might be due merely to chance. However,
where modeling is involved there is a pitfall in Fisherism: one must not
adopt absurd models (e.g., here, uniform or Poisson cases) as “null models,”
because by that methodology any desired model can be ratified. I adopted for
the null a model with the same observed frequencies of lower/higher types,
then selected Rl and Rh at random but restricted so that R0 = 1. By sim-
ulation we obtain a probability that the observed R0 would be equaled or
exceeded in non-pandemic SS models, i.e., a “type-I error.” (See the Ap-
pendix for details.) That permits an announcement with confidence, e.g.,
“The probability of a pandemic has now exceeded (say) 90 percent.”
As I showed in paper I of this series, SS epidemics can have a high proba-
a pandemic.
8Which raises an interesting questions about estimating with long-tailed distributions:
is there some general statement of the form, “If your first estimate is that Rˆ0 = something,
is it probably x percent higher?” I hope to address this question in a later publication.
9Fig. 6 suggests using ordinary, normal-distribution based CIs, but recall that figure
assumed 2,000 cases; with fewer we can not be confident of the normal law.
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Figure 8: R0 estimated (log-transformed method) from data at early time
points in the epidemic.
Stopping the SS Epidemic III: Prediction 17
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
300 400 500 600 700
1.
3
1.
4
1.
5
1.
6
1.
7
1.
8
R0 estimates (MLE) vs. case accumulation
case index
R
0h
at
Figure 9: R0 estimated (MLEs) from secondaries-plus-infectious-periods data
at early time points in the epidemic.
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bility that a given infection chain started from one “index” case goes extinct.
For example, with the model selected here for illustrative purposes, the ex-
tinction probability, pe, was about 0.991.
10 As a consequence of these high
extinction rates, there may be a long period in which sporadic cases appear
but the infection-chains peter out, which again biases us towards optimism
that we have escaped the worst. Now consider prediction. Suppose that,
as the epidemic progresses, we apply our statistical analysis to case/contact
data and, at some point, obtain an estimated R0 that is greater than one,
with a p-value less than 0.111 But when will the pandemic start?
Here we must take into account Fig. 8, which suggests that our first
indication of a pandemic will probably coincide with an SS event. So we
should estimate the time-to-pandemic by:
time-to-pandemic = pne
(
mean sporadic interval
1− pe
)
. (2)
where n denotes the number of secondary cases of the case appearing at the
instant in question (which will admittedly take some extra time to locate).
The first factor takes into account that, if one of the chains begun by these
secondaries goes pandemic, the pandemic is already underway (so an omitted
term: (1 − pne ) × 0), and otherwise we wait until some future sporadic case
generates the pandemic.
Figure 10 shows a histogram of n12 and Fig. 11 the times-to-pandemic,13
made using the MLE-with-infectiousness-periods method, for runs with p-
value less than 0.1. Note that many of the latter are large, even years. A
somewhat more conservative prediction results by replacing “n” in equation
(2) by the number of cases existing at the prediction point (counting secon-
daries created by the superspreader), producing Figure 12. Figure 13 shows
the estimated R0’s at the prediction.
14
10Extinction probabilities are not available analytically except for unrealistic Markovian
models, see paper I appendix; so they were computed by simulating 1,000 epidemics.
11Not 0.05; the goal isn’t to get a paper published, but to stop a pandemic!
12The bump at n = 0 is Fig. 10 is due to starting the analysis of the {ni}’s just
after when total cases exceeded 200, to avoid lots of unfittable instances. Frequently, the
first analysis generated a significant R0 > 1, halting the search. Since most cases are
low-spreaders who generate no secondaries, the last n was often zero. Incident cases can
be zero, too, because the disease in humans had gone temporarily extinct. The period
explored was between 200 and 400 cases.
13The sporadic period was three days.
14Fig. 13 seems to show a right-end tail, whose origin in this complicated context eludes
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Figure 10: “n” at the pandemic prediction (MLE method).
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Histogram of time−to−pandemic at the prediction
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Figure 11: “Time-to-pandemic” at the prediction (MLE method, using last
“n”).
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Histogram of time−to−pandemic (using cases at prediction)
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Figure 12: “Time-to-pandemic” at the prediction (MLE, using cases instead
of “n”).
Stopping the SS Epidemic III: Prediction 22
Histogram of estimated R0, at prediction
R0hat
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Figure 13: Estimated R0’s at the prediction.
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Two other issues will produce more bias, in the familiar direction. As
pointed out in paper I, a long “kindling period” when sporadic cases gen-
erate infection clusters that disappear will surely lead anyone unaware of
extra-Poisson variation and extinction probabilities to imitate the managers
of the Space Shuttle program before the Challenger catastrophe (who, after
each launch without a disaster, were reassured about their risk judgement).
Finally, secondary cases missing at random will produce bias towards under-
estimating R0.
To summarize: I have presented a small study, using simulations from
mathematical models and conventional statistical ideas, on the topic of whether
we should be able to predict the occurrence of a SuperSpreader epidemic of
the SARS/MERS type given contact data. The main conclusion is that care
must be taken that mathematical modeling and statistical methodology do
not add to a false sense of security which will arise anyway from the long “kin-
dling period” and certain other, non-mathematical biases we all share. The
methods I propose in this paper can overcome the statistical bias problems,
granted adequate data and some modeling assumptions.15 That a pandemic
can often be predicted long before it begins is perhaps not so surprising;
think of predicting when somebody will win in a repeated drawing in a lot-
tery, given facts such as how many people are buying tickets and the number
of winning balls in the urn. Fitting a model is a means of finding those
facts; then mathematics (meaning today, computers) allows us to make the
prediction.
Re those “other” sources of error, consider what psychologists call “ex-
planatory bias” (but which might better be called “explanatory hubris”). I
refer to the universal tendency to imagine that one has found the explana-
tion for an unusual or shocking event, and hence to believe that it was a
one-time occurrence or that it can easily be prevented in the future. (Viz.
that use of the aspirator in the ER that produced 140+ SARS cases in the
Prince of Wales Hospital in Hong Kong in 2003, or the putative wave of camel
births in Saudi Arabia in the Spring of 2014, which somehow didn’t cause
a bump in MERS cases a year earlier.) No one, including myself, desires to
use stochastic modeling when a deterministic explanation can be found. But
me.
15Many of these assumptions can be dropped without causing problems for the statistical
methods. For instance, the two-level model was chosen for convenience, and can be easily
replaced by, e.g., the power-law distribution from paper II, with appropriate changes in
the likelihood when using the ML method.
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sometimes we can do better by incorporating randomness into our theory as
a preventive for hubris. Finally, there is the bureaucratic tendency to err on
the side of not creating panic or generating reports that might displease the
boss. Governments in the past have gone as far down this road as to deny
the occurrence of earthquakes, nuclear meltdowns, or disease outbreaks.
In regards to MERS in 2014, as I write governments have behaved more
responsibly in reporting cases to WHO than was true for SARS in 2003,
which is a step in the right direction. Epidemiologists cannot be expected to
give sound advice to governments if they have to work from inadequate or
distorted data. MERS poses a potentially a greater risk to the world than did
SARS, which went extinct after the zoonotic source, an exotic wild cat sold
in live-animal markets in China, was eliminated.16 If indeed the reservoir
for MERS is camels, which are plentiful in the Middle East and Northern
Africa, re-introductions into the human population may continue for a long
time. And the case mortality is frightful.
We modelers should not add to the false-sense of security problem, espe-
cially when thousands or millions of lives are at risk. The results of this
paper demonstrate that, with some attention to statistical issues, modeling
can make a contribution to preventing a global MERS epidemic.
Appendix: statistical methods
The model and fixed parameters (mean and variance of non-infectious and in-
fectious periods) were described in previous papers. I modified the simulation
routine to record the case index of primaries that infected each secondary,
then back-tracked to produce the {ni}. If it were not for censoring, the statis-
tical problem would be straighforward: given an i.i.d. sample of nonnegative
integers drawn from a distribution:
Pθ [ n = k ] = p
(
Rkl
k!
)
E
(
φk e−Rl φ
)
+ (1− p)
(
Rkh
k!
)
E
(
φk e−Rh φ
)
;
φ = exp
(
σ Z − 1
2
σ2
)
, (3)
estimate the model parameters, denoted by letter θ. Z is a standard normal
random variable and σ (fixed) is chosen to give the required variance (i.e.,
16As we have seen, extinction is a possibility that SS models, even with R0 > 1, permit.
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the true infection period for each case equals the mean infection period times
φ). E denotes expectation over Z. Here θ stands for either (p,Rl, Rh) or,
equivalently, (Rl, Rh, R0) where
R0 = pRl + (1− p)Rh. (4)
I first tried the following, rather crude, non-parametric approach: I esti-
mated the three parameters by
Nl =
∑
1 [ni <= 5 ] ;
pˆ = Nl/N ;
Rˆl = ( 1/Nl )
∑
1 [ni <= 5 ] ni;
Nh =
∑
1 [ni > 5 ] ;
Rˆh = ( 1/Nh )
∑
1 [ni > 5 ] ni;
Rˆ0 = pˆ Rˆl + (1− pˆ) Rˆh. (5)
This simple scheme had too much bias, as seen in Fig. 1.
So I next tried a maximum likelihood improvement. Defining the likelihood
as usual:
L =
N∏
i=1
Pθ (ni ) , (6)
and the score and Hessian by:
Sj =
∂ log(L)
∂θj
;
Hj,k =
∂2 log(L)
∂θj ∂θk
; (7)
(8)
I used the non-parametric estimates (assuming Nl and Nh were at least five)
as starting points for Newton-Raphson iterations:
θ
′
j = θj −
∑
k
[
H−1
]
j,k
Sk. (9)
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These iterations either failed immediately, because det(H) had the wrong
sign (positive, when it should be negative), indicating lack of convexity of
the likelihood surface, or (in most runs) reduced the magnitude of the score
by a factor of 10−4. (The expectation over Z in equations (3) was performed
numerically, using 200 evaluation points.) Starting at, e.g., random choices of
the θk’s, usually failed by the determinant-sign, indicating that the likelihood
is rarely globally convex for this problem, raising lack-of-identifiability issues.
As remarked in the text, there was still considerable bias in the ML-
improved estimates, so I tried a log transformation, redefining:
Rl[logtrans] = ( 1/Nl )
∑
1 [ni <= 5 ] log(1 + ni);
Rh[logtrans] = ( 1/Nh )
∑
1 [ni > 5 ] log(1 + ni);
(10)
and then fitting the model by using the previous estimate for pˆ but solving
the equations:
∑
k
{ (
Rkl
k!
)
E
(
φk e−Rl φ
)
log(1 + k)
}
= Rl[logtrans];
∑
k
{ (
Rkh
k!
)
E
(
φk e−Rh φ
)
log(1 + k)
}
= Rh[logtrans],
for the Rˆ’s by one-dimensional line searches. (The sums over k can be trun-
cated by careful treatment of the summand exponent, using Stirling.) Defin-
ing Rˆ0 as usual gave Fig. 4.
With the amplified data {ni, τi}, the likelihood becomes simpler:
L =
N∏
i=1
Pθ (ni, τi ) , (11)
Pθ [ n = k; τ = t ] = p
(
[ ρl t ]
k
k!
)
e− [ ρl t ] +
(1− p)
(
[ ρh t ]
k
k!
)
e− [ ρh t ];
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ρh =
Rh
Inf
;
ρl =
Rl
Inf
; (12)
where Inf stands for mean infectious period. Again using the nonparametric
estimates as starting points, the Hessian determinant had the right sign,
Newton-Raphson iterates converged quickly and reduced the score to zero.
Re confidence, I first tried leaving out one of the {ni, τi}, but the resulting
confidence intervals were absurdly narrow. I then tried resampling, but now
they were too wide. Moreover, I don’t have a grasp of what such confidence
statements are supposed to mean; what we really want to know is how likely
was the observation that R0 > 1, if in truth it wasn’t. So I retreated to
making p-values by simulation, as follows. Given the estimated lower-type
probability, p, I randomly chose Rl and Rh so that pRl + (1 − p)Rh = 1,
starting with Rh uniform on [3, 0.95/(1 − p)], 1,000 times. For each choice,
I simulated a trajectory and refit the model to the mock data, generating
a new R0; if this R0 was equal to or greater than the original estimate, it
counted as rejecting the null hypothesis when it was true. Then the p-value
was set to: (count)/1,000. The method had power, with a type-I error rate
of 0.1 and 1,000 cases, to reject the null when it was false (namely for the
illustrative model, with R0 = 1.4), of 0.77.
C code is available from the author on request.
For you statisticians who might be interested: I did consider several other
ideas/improvements. In the book [5] I advertised the kNN method of model
fitting, which arose in computer science back in the 1950s for problems in
pattern recognition. This “generic” method was used in paper I for fitting SS
epidemic models to some MERS cluster data, and in paper II to case data,
but as it does not directly aim at estimating R0 it may not be convincing
to many people. And, as kNN reduces to maximum likelihood if you can
simulate fast enough, it should suffer from the bias problem I demonstrated
in Fig. 2. On that issue, there is a large literature on reducing bias in ML
estimation. The idea is to modify the likelihood, perhaps by subtracting
something which will cancel the bias. However, all the suggestions I found
in the literature (which are typically tested on trivial, exactly-solvable, ex-
amples) involve taking three or more derivatives of the loglikelihood. My
enthusiasm flagged at that point. Re identifiability for the ni-only data, per-
haps the power-law model from paper II would be an improvement. Or is
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there some simpler model with plausible biological interpretation but also
with globally identifiable parameters, granted sufficient data? (However, it
is a mortal sin to abandon realism and mutilate a model simply in order to
gain identifiability of parameters.) I leave these problems to those interested,
but remark that, noting the extreme skewness and outliers in distributions
generated by SS epidemics, any such methods should be thoroughly tested
by simulation from an appropriate model.
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